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Constitutional Cases 2015: 
An Overview 
Lorne Sossin* 
This contribution reviews the Constitutional Cases issued by the 
Supreme Court in 2015. The analysis is divided into three parts. In the 
first part, as in previous years, I begin with an analysis of the year as a 
whole, identifying noteworthy statistics or trends. In the second part,  
I explore some specific Constitutional decisions of the Court – especially 
those revealing important divergences on the Court around the scope and 
reach of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 and the premise 
of Federalism – in greater detail. I conclude, in the third part, with a 
discussion of the evolving composition of the Court, and the significance 
of the departure of Justice Rothstein, together with the arrival of Justices 
Côté and Brown. 
I. 2015: A YEAR IN REVIEW 
2015 was a remarkable year by any standard. In total, the Supreme 
Court of Canada (“SCC”) decided 68 cases during this calendar year. Of 
these, I characterize 28 cases as Constitutional decisions, including 22 
identified by the SCC as such in their headnotes and keyword system, 
and a further six that deal with constitutional principles, constitutional 
provisions or constitutional values.2 
                                                                                                                       
* Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am deeply indebted to 
three Osgoode Hall Law School students, Tristan Davis, Irina Samborski and Raymond Seelen, for 
their superb research and collaboration on the statistical review of 2015 for the Constitutional Cases 
Conference, held at Osgoode on April 8, 2016. I also benefited from the lively discussions on that 
day with many of those in attendance. Ben Berger and Sonia Lawrence provided invaluable 
assistance as conveners of the Conference and I am grateful for their editorial assistance. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 The cases identified are: R. v. Appulonappa, [2015] S.C.J. No. 59, 2015 SCC 59 (S.C.C.), 
affg [2014] B.C.J. No. 762 (B.C.C.A.); Caron v. Alberta, [2015] S.C.J. No. 56, 2015 SCC 56 
(S.C.C.), affg [2014] A.J. No. 174 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Moriarity, [2015] S.C.J. No. 55, 2015 SCC 55 
(S.C.C.); 407 ETR Concession Co. v. Canada (Superintendent of Bankruptcy), [2015] S.C.J. No. 52, 
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This figure takes on significance in light of the steady decline in the 
number of overall judgments from the Court (79 in 2014 to 68 in 2015), and 
the steady increase in the number of constitutional judgments (19 in 2014 to 
28 in 2015), with the proportion of judgments devoted to constitutional 
issues correspondingly rising (now approximately 40 per cent).  
While it would be wrong to suggest the Supreme Court of Canada is 
becoming more akin to a Constitutional Court, it is fair to say the centrality 
of Constitutional cases within the Supreme Court firmament is becoming 
more apparent. In particular, it is worth highlighting that, between 2013 
and 2015, the number of Charter of Rights and Freedoms cases increased 
by 58 per cent. 
Notwithstanding the maturing of Canada’s Constitutional 
jurisprudence, Constitutional Applicants continue to enjoy significant 
success before the Supreme Court. Applicants were successful in 13 of 
the 28 cases, or 46 per cent of the time (including partial successes, such  
                                                                                                                       
2015 SCC 52 (S.C.C.); Alberta (Attorney General) v. Moloney, [2015] S.C.J. No. 51, 2015 SCC 51 
(S.C.C.), affg [2014] A.J. No. 155 (Alta. C.A.); Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Lemare Lake 
Logging Ltd., [2015] S.C.J. No. 53, 2015 SCC 53 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] S.J. No. 164 (Sask. C.A.); 
Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), [2015] S.C.J. No. 46, 2015 SCC 
46 (S.C.C.); B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] S.C.J. No. 58, 2015 SCC 58 
(S.C.C.), revg [2013] F.C.J. No. 322 (F.C.A.); Guindon v. Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 41, 2015 SCC 
41 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] F.C.J. No. 673 (F.C.A.); R. v. Simpson, [2015] S.C.J. No. 40, 2015 SCC 40, 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.), revg [2014] Q.J. No. 5425 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Smith, [2015] S.C.J.  
No. 34, 2015 SCC 34, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 602 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] B.C.J. No. 2097 (B.C.C.A.); 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Barnaby, [2015] S.C.J. No. 102, 2015 SCC 31, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 563 
(S.C.C.), revg [2013] Q.J. No. 8752 (Que. C.A.); Caplin v. Canada (Justice), [2015] S.C.J. No. 32, 
2015 SCC 32, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 570 (S.C.C.); Kahkewistahaw First Nation v. Taypotat, [2015] S.C.J. 
No. 30, 2015 SCC 30, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 548 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kokopenace, [2015] S.C.J. No. 28, 2015 
SCC 28, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 398 (S.C.C.); Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. 
Yukon (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 25, 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 282 (S.C.C.); Henry 
v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 24, 2015 SCC 24, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 214 
(S.C.C.); Association des parents de l’école Rose-des-vents v. British Columbia (Education), [2015] 
S.C.J. No. 21, 2015 SCC 21, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.), revg [2014] B.C.J. No. 155 (B.C.C.A.); 
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 22, 2015 SCC 22, 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 179 (S.C.C.); R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 
(S.C.C.), affg [2013] O.J. No. 5120 (Ont. C.A.); Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, 2015 SCC 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] J.Q. no 
6676 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Sanghera, [2015] S.C.J. No. 13, 2015 SCC 13, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 691 (S.C.C.); 
Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 12, 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 
S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.), revg [2012] J.Q. no 15094 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Loyola”]; Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 7, 2015 SCC 7, 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 401 (S.C.C.), varg [2013] B.C.J. No. 632 (B.C.C.A.); Carter v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.), revg [2013] B.C.J. No. 
2227 (B.C.C.A.); Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 2, 2015 SCC 2, [2015] 
1 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] F.C.J. No. 465 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Meredith”]; and Mounted 
Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, 2015 SCC 1, 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), revg [2012] O.J. No. 2420 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Mounted Police”]. 
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as Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (where one of two impugned 
sections was struck down) and Law Societies of Canada (where three of 
five impugned sections were read down).  
If there is a trend apparent in the successful cases, it may be 
reluctance of the Court to strike down legislation. In the 13 successful 
Constitutional claims, the Supreme Court: 
(1) read down provisions in 6 cases;  
(2) struck down sections only in 4 cases (with 3 suspended declarations 
of invalidity); 
(3) issued declaratory relief in 2 cases and  
(4) granted 1 motion.  
While a one-year snapshot cannot provide a full portrait of a judge on the 
Supreme Court, it can suggest key roles particular judges play within the 
Court’s jurisprudence. 
Significantly, Chief Justice McLachlin authored the most majority 
decisions (6) – it is, after all, the McLachlin Court – while Justices 
Abella and Cromwell authored 5 majority judgments each. Chief Justice 
McLachlin also has the distinction of authoring the most concurring 
judgments (4) and the fewest dissenting judgments (0)! By contrast, 
Justice Wagner authored the most dissenting judgments (3) followed by 
retiring Justice Rothstein (2). In light of the influence of some of the 
Court’s most seasoned voices, it remains difficult to decipher where 
some of the more recently appointed members of the Court will leave 
their mark on the Canadian Constitution.  
Against this backdrop, I explore some of the most notable cases of 
2015. Beyond the implications to which each gives rise (and many other 
important decisions that I do not specifically review), are there any clear 
or emerging themes to the Constitutional jurisprudence of the year? In 
my view, 2015 revealed some key fissures on the Court around the reach 
of the Charter (in labour relations where Charter rights are asserted, in 
administrative justice where Charter values are at play and in cases 
where Charter damages are claimed) and the premise of Federalism 
(whether legislative jurisdiction is seen through the lens of a single level 
of government or through the partnerships between levels of government 
increasingly required to achieve policy ends). Below, I examine some of 
the key cases revealing these fissures, and their implications, in more 
detail. 
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II. 2015: THE YEAR, IN CASES 
As noted above, the Supreme Court decided 28 cases featuring the 
Constitution. The most significant activity involved developments under 
sections 2, 7 and 24(1) of the Constitution and the distribution of 
legislative powers under Canadian federalism. 
The 2015 Constitutional cases were notable not just for some 
important judgments with wide-ranging implications, but also for a 
resurgence in the number of interveners taking part in those cases. For 
example, in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (discussed below, 
which recognized the right to strike under section 2(d) right to 
association), the Court granted intervener status to 35 groups. The 
consideration of whether a deadline for invalidity in Carter should be 
extended featured 26 Interveners, while Loyola (applying Charter values 
in the context of religious freedom) and Henry (establishing new test for 
Charter damages) had 17 and 14 Interveners participating, respectively. 
Below, I discuss the labour and section 2(d) trilogy: Saskatchewan 
Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, Mounted Police Association of 
Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General) and Meredith v. Canada (Attorney 
General),3 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General) the 
culminating judgment in a series of cases exploring co-operative 
federalism; a continuation of the Court’s exploration of Charter values in 
Loyola; and the Charter damages case, Henry. These cases, in my view, 
are likely to have the most significant impact in charting Canada’s 
Constitutional jurisprudence.  
Any selection of cases for scrutiny among such a rich pool of over two 
dozen decisions is necessarily subjective and easily critiqued for what is 
left out. Many will say that one of the most significant decisions in 2015 
was R. v. Nur,4 for example, which suggests that only evidence based 
justifications for mandatory minimum sentences will pass constitutional 
muster under the “cruel and unusual treatment” test of section 12 of the 
Charter. Others will point to the significance of the exploration of the role 
of lawyers and solicitor-client relationships under section 7 of the Charter 
in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada,5 
as one of the year’s most noteworthy decisions. I welcome the debates 
surrounding why a particular judgment is seen as more significant than 
                                                                                                                       
3 Supra, note 2. 
4 Supra, note 2. 
5 Supra, note 2. 
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2015 5 
others, and I would not want to suggest any Supreme Court decisions do 
not merit more scrutiny. Selecting the particular cluster of cases for further 
commentary below had less to do with the impact of a decision in the 
moment and more to do with the implications of a decision for the future. 
In each of the cases below, I provide an analysis of why I believe the 
implications of these cases justify special attention. 
1. Procedural Justice and Section 2(d) Freedom of Association: 
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, Mounted 
Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General)  
& Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General) 
The Supreme Court is in the midst of a fundamental, far-reaching and 
ground-shifting revision of the intersection between Constitutional law and 
Labour law in Canada. In the trilogy of Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 
Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), and 
Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), the Supreme Court continued to 
develop the scope, coverage and implications of section 2(d) of the Charter. 
While a trilogy of cases in the early days of Charter jurisprudence in 1987 
suggested the freedom of association would not guarantee rights to 
collective bargaining,6 or the right to strike, the Court reinvigorated these 
debates in 2010 with its landmark Health Services and Support — Facilities 
Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,7 recognizing a right to 
collective bargaining. At the time, Health Services seemed to fit within a 
template of cases delineating more robust procedural protections under the 
Charter.8 In 2015, however, the Supreme Court made clear at least in the 
context of labour, the Charter section 2(d) boundary between procedural and 
substantive justice remains very much a work in progress. 
In Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan,9 the 
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour challenged the constitutional validity 
of The Public Service Essential Services Act 2008 and The Trade Union 
Amendment Act 2008 arguing that the legislation infringed the freedom of 
                                                                                                                       
6 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 
1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.), affg [1984] A.J. No. 616 (Alta. C.A.); PSAC v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.), affg [1984] F.C.J. No. 183 (F.C.A.); and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.), revg [1985] S.J. No. 476 (Sask. C.A.). 
7 [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27 (S.C.C.), varg [2004] B.C.J. No. 1354 (B.C.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Saskatchewan Federation of Labour”]. 
8 See, for example, “The Promise of Procedural Justice” in A. Dodek and D. Wright (eds.), 
Public Law at the McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin, 2011), at 55-76.  
9 [2015] S.C.J. No. 4, 2015 SCC 4 (S.C.C.), varg [2013] S.J. No. 235 (Sask. C.A.). 
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association of employees protected by section 2(d) of the Charter, and could 
not be saved under section 1. In the context of more and more services being 
designated as “essential” by Canadian governments, the stakes were 
extremely high, with some wondering whether the Supreme Court would 
find a free-standing right to strike under the section 2(d) right to freedom of 
association (or even a derivative right as part of what the already recognized 
right to collective bargaining might entail). 
The Court split in its findings on the two pieces of legislation, striking 
down The Public Service Essential Services Act 2008 (with the declaration 
of invalidity suspended for 12 months) while upholding The Trade Union 
Amendment Act 2008.10 The Public Service Essential Services Act was found 
to infringe section 2(d) of the Charter because it “substantially interfered” 
with the freedom of public sector employees to take meaningful strike 
action. 
The right to strike was recognized by the majority as protected activity 
under freedom of association, not simply derivative of the right to 
collective bargaining under section 2(d). The impugned Act directed that in 
the absence of an agreement with the Union, the Crown and other public 
employers could unilaterally determine employees to be “essential” and 
preclude legal strike. In light of this broad authority, the Act was found by 
the majority not to satisfy the minimal impairment test under section 1. 
The Court found no such infringement with respect to The Trade Union 
Amendment Act 2008, however, which dealt with the requirements for 
union certification and the process for decertification. The Court held that 
the provisions of this legislation did not have the effect of preventing 
employees from bargaining collectively through a trade union of their own 
choosing under section 2(d), nor did the Act interfere with the expression 
of freedom by employees under section 2(b).  
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour represents the first case in which 
the Supreme Court definitively recognized a right to strike under the 
Charter. Justice Abella, writing for the majority, stated, 
...The right to strike is not merely derivative of collective bargaining,  
it is an indispensable component of that right. It seems to me to be the 
time to give this conclusion constitutional benediction.11 
                                                                                                                       
10 The Public Service Essential Services Act, c. P-42.2 of the Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2008 
(effective May 14, 2008) as amended (repealed) by the Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2014, c. S-32.21; 
the Trade Union Amendment Act, 2008, S.S. 2008, c. 26 and c. 2. 
11 Id., at para. 3. 
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Beyond the many essential services statutes which may now need to 
be revisited with the Court’s framework in Saskatchewan Federation of 
Labour in mind, the Court signalled it would not shy away from a more 
muscular role in restraining the state from legislative unilateralism in the 
labour context. The dissenting Justices (Rothstein and Wagner JJ.) take 
issue with the majority’s foray into what they see as an inherently 
political trade-off in how Governments organize labour relations, and do 
so by quoting two members of that majority (Chief Justice McLachlin 
and LeBel J.) in an earlier case: 
McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J., writing for a unanimous Court 
in R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., 
2002 SCC 8, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, cautioned that 
[j]udging the appropriate balance between employers and 
unions is a delicate and essentially political matter. Where the 
balance is struck may vary with the labour climates from 
region to region. This is the sort of question better dealt with 
by legislatures than courts. Labour relations is a complex and 
changing field, and courts should be reluctant to put forward 
simplistic dictums. [para. 85] 
Thirteen years later, the majority in this case ignores this sage warning 
in reaching its conclusion. Our colleagues have taken it upon 
themselves to determine “the appropriate balance between employers 
and unions”, despite the fact that this balance is not any less delicate or 
political today than it was in 2002. In our respectful view, the majority 
is wrong to intrude into the policy development role of elected 
legislators by constitutionalizing the right to strike.12 
This more activist and expansive role for the Court was tested in 
Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General),13 
where the Court considered legislation circumscribing how the RCMP 
could engage in collective bargaining, and in the companion case of 
Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), in which the Court examined 
whether a reduction in pay for RCMP officers violated the Charter. The 
differing outcomes in these cases provide a clearer picture of the freedom 
of association under section 2(d) and the boundaries of state action in 
constraining unions. 
                                                                                                                       
12 Id., at para. 105. 
13 Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 2, 
online: <http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/14577/index.do>. 
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At issue in Mounted Police was the RCMP labour relations regime, 
which did not involve a trade union but rather a Staff Relations 
Representative Program [SRRP]. The SRRP permitted RCMP members 
to engage in resolving labour issues (though not salary) and, through a 
National Executive Committee staffed by member representatives from 
various RCMP divisions and regions, to be consulted on human 
resources policies. Under this scheme, however, the final say was with 
management. This scheme had been upheld under section 2(d) of the 
Charter in Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General).14 
The challenge in Mounted Police involved two private associations of 
RCMP members who sought to represent RCMP members in Ontario and 
British Columbia. They argued that the imposition of the SRRP as a 
labour relations regime infringed members’ freedom of association. 
The majority interpreted section 2(d) as guaranteeing a “meaningful 
process” of collective bargaining which includes a degree of choice and 
independence. It found the impugned labour relations regime for RCMP 
members denied them that choice. While reiterating that section 2(d) 
guarantees a process, not a result, the majority held that the government 
cannot enact laws that substantially interfere with the right of employees 
to associate for the purpose of meaningfully pursuing collective 
workplace goals. In other words, a process of collective bargaining will 
not be meaningful if it denies employees the power to pursue their goals, 
as in the Mounted Police context. 
In a jointly authored majority judgment, the Chief Justice and Justice 
LeBel (in one of his final judgments, as he formally retired in November 
of 2014) noted that section 2(d) does not require a single ideal model for 
collective bargaining, but does require balance and equilibrium between 
employers and employees: 
The search is not for an “ideal” model of collective bargaining, but 
rather for a model which provides sufficient employee choice and 
independence to permit the formulation and pursuit of employee 
interests in the particular workplace context at issue. Choice and 
independence do not require adversarial labour relations; nothing in 
the Charter prevents an employee association from engaging willingly 
with an employer in different, less adversarial and more cooperative 
ways. This said, genuine collective bargaining cannot be based on the 
suppression of employees’ interests, where these diverge from those of 
their employer, in the name of a “non-adversarial” process. Whatever 
                                                                                                                       
14 [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.), affg [1997] J.Q. no 189 (Que. C.A.).  
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the model, the Charter does not permit choice and independence to be 
eroded such that there is substantial interference with a meaningful 
process of collective bargaining. Designation of collective bargaining 
agents and determination of collective bargaining frameworks would 
therefore not breach s. 2 (d) where the structures that are put in place 
are free from employer interference, remain under the control of 
employees and provide employees with sufficient choice over the 
workplace goals they wish to advance.15 
Applying this standard, the majority found that the SRRP scheme imposed 
on RCMP members results in their being represented by an organization 
they did not choose or control. Further, as part of the management 
structure of the RCMP, the SRRP structure lacked independence. The 
majority concluded that the SRRP process did not achieve the necessary 
balance between employees and employer. 
The violation of section 2(d) was found not to be justified under 
section 1 as the majority concluded there the objective of maintaining an 
independent and objective police force is not rationally connected to the 
exclusion of RCMP members from a statutorily protected collective 
bargaining process. The majority further observed (in obiter) that the 
RCMP is the only police force in Canada without a collective agreement 
to regulate the working conditions of its officers, a status that the Court 
found would have justified the conclusion that the measure was not 
minimally impairing – had it been necessary to undertake that analysis. 
Once again, Justice Rothstein issued a sharply worded dissent (this time 
alone), asserting that concerns such as maintaining “the balance between 
employees and employer” and attaining “equilibrium” in labour relations are 
the concerns of governments and legislatures, not the judiciary.16 
Finally, in Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General),17 the Supreme Court 
considered a challenge by RCMP members of the SRRP over a unilateral 
roll back of wages pursuant to the Expenditure Restraint Act.18 With a 
notable dissent by Justice Abella (who, as noted, authored the majority 
reasons in the Saskatchewan Federation judgment), the majority concluded 
the wage restraint imposed through the Act was not unconstitutional. 
The majority concluded that while the labour relations process may 
attract scrutiny under section 2(d), the focus of that scrutiny will be whether 
                                                                                                                       
15 Id., at para. 97. 
16 Id., at para. 162. 
17 Supra, note 2.  
18 S.C. 2009, c. 2, s. 393, which imposed a limit of 1.5 per cent on wage increases in the public 
sector for the 2008 to 2010 fiscal years.  
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a statute or process interferes with the RCMP members’ freedom of 
association. The limits imposed by the impugned Act were shared by all 
public servants, and did not preclude consultation on other compensation-
related issues in the future (and, indeed, an exception for RCMP members 
included in the Act allowed RCMP members to obtain significant benefits 
as a result of subsequent proposals) – as a result, the Court found the impact 
of the Act on the associational activity of RCMP members was minor. 
Taken together, the trilogy of Saskatchewan Federation, Mounted 
Police and Meredith, constitute a significant advance in the Supreme 
Court’s engagement in the labour field, and refinement of section 2(d) of 
the Charter. Looking just at the majority judgments in these three cases, it 
is possible to chart the boundaries of state interference in the associational 
process, which will attract constitutional intervention. Where state action 
can be shown to materially impair the associational process, including in 
its substantive manifestations, such as the right to strike, the Court will 
step in. While this procedural governance of labour relations is becoming 
more robust, the Court remains reticent to dictate outcomes, or appear to 
tilt the delicate balance to which labour relations strive. The more the 
Court intervenes in labour relations cases, however, the more dependent all 
parties may become on litigation to maintain this balance. 
2. The Premise of Federalism: Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada 
(the “Gun Registry”) 
In the sharply divided 5-4 Gun Registry decision,19 the majority of the 
Supreme Court upheld the Federal Government’s right to destroy data 
collected through the discontinued long gun registry.20 The majority 
concluded that the Federal government’s legislative authority over 
criminal law matters gave it the authority to dispose of the data if it 
wished. Notably, the four Justices in dissent included all three of the 
Justices appointed from Quebec (the province that brought the challenge 
against the Federal Government’s decision).  
While the decision explores (once again) the existential purposes of 
Canadian federalism, it also engages politics, as the long gun registry has 
been a flashpoint since the Liberals (under Prime Minister Jean Chretien) 
created the registry in 1995. Gun licensing data were collected by an officer 
                                                                                                                       
19 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 2. 
20 See Judy Hemming, “Battle of the Doctrines, Division of Powers Trumps Cooperative 
Federalism: Quebec (AG) v Canada” (April 3, 2016), online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2015/04/in-a-
battle-of-the-doctrines-division-of-powers-trumps-cooperative-federalism-quebec-ag-v-canada/>. 
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2015 11 
in each province. After winning his first majority in 2011, Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper’s Conservative government introduced the Ending the  
Long-Gun Registry Act.21 This Act repealed the requirement for the 
registration of non-restricted weapons, known as long guns. That legislation 
also authorized the destruction of already collected data.  
The Supreme Court had already situated the Federal Government’s 
authority to create a gun registry in its legislative jurisdiction over 
Criminal Law.22 For the majority, Justices Cromwell and Karakatsanis 
assert the primacy of the “constitutional boundaries that underlie the 
division of powers” so that, where clearly stated as in areas such as 
Criminal Law, the notion of cooperative or flexible federalism cannot 
modify or constrain this jurisdiction.23 They state, 
Neither this Court’s jurisprudence nor the text of the Constitution Act, 
1867 supports using that principle [the principle of cooperative 
federalism] to limit the scope of legislative authority or to impose a 
positive obligation to facilitate cooperation where the constitutional 
division of powers authorizes unilateral action. To hold otherwise 
would undermine parliamentary sovereignty and create legal 
uncertainty whenever one order of government adopted legislation 
having some impact on the policy objectives of another. Paradoxically, 
such an approach could discourage the practice of cooperative 
federalism for fear that cooperative measures could risk diminishing a 
government’s legislative authority to act alone.24 
The dissenting minority held that the destruction of the data was 
unconstitutional, citing the doctrine of cooperative federalism. Written 
jointly by Justices LeBel, Wagner and Gascon, the dissenting judgment 
would have allowed the appeal (in part). Invoking “a modern view of 
federalism”, the dissent adopts a more flexible account of federalism, 
especially in settings where the policy or law in question required both 
federal and provincial government action to be effective (as in the case).25  
The dissent focused on the section of the Act which precluded data 
transfer to the provinces, which they concluded “has significant effects 
on Quebec’s legislative powers and is not necessary to the achievement 
                                                                                                                       
21 S.C. 2012, c. 6.  
22 See Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 2. 
23 Id., at paras. 62-68. 
24 Id., at para. 20. 
25 Id., at para. 147. 
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of the ELRA’s purpose.”26 For this reason, the dissent would have found 
the provision unconstitutional. 
At first glance, it does not seem controversial to assert that the 
constitutional jurisdiction to enact legislation in a given field must 
include the jurisdiction to repeal that legislation, or otherwise modify it. 
As Ian Peach has observed, however, the issue that is less straightforward 
is whether the constitutional jurisdiction of one level of government can 
be constrained by a positive duty to cooperate with the other.27 While the 
Federal Government was free to establish (or not) a gun registry, once 
one is established, and integrated with provincial law enforcement (and 
there was no question in this case that Quebec actively relied on the very 
data which the Act sought to have destroyed), should the Federal 
Government’s ability to destroy that data be constrained by provincial 
reliance on it?  
The dissent’s vision of cooperative federalism in this regard is 
compelling. They construe the scheme from the outset as a partnership 
between federal and provincial governments (and, indeed, the federal 
scheme relied on provincial action to register guns in a particular 
province). For Quebec, the reality of this partnership must inform the 
question of whether the Government that established the basis for that 
partnership can unilaterally repeal it. In their view, destroying the registry 
data relating to Quebec undermines Quebec’s exercise of its constitutional 
jurisdiction over law enforcement and civil rights in the province and is 
not necessary for the goals of the Act (discontinuing the federal registry). 
The implications of this judgment are far-reaching, in light of how 
many crucial initiatives in the offing require federal-provincial 
partnerships (from medically assisted dying to legalizing and regulating 
marijuana). The lack of consensus on the Supreme Court as to the 
overarching vision of Canadian federalism is not encouraging. 
3. Valuing the Charter: Loyola v. Quebec (Attorney General)  
Among the areas with potential to affect the scope and relevance of 
Constitutional law in Canada, the emerging doctrine of Charter values 
may top the list. On the one hand, it appears not to be part of Constitutional 
                                                                                                                       
26 Id., at para. 51. 
27 Ian Peach, “The Supreme Court of Canada Long-Gun Registry Decision: The 
Constitutional Question Behind an Intergovernmental Relations Failure” (2015) 24 Constitutional 
Forum 1 at 2, online: <https://ualawccsprod.srv.ualberta.ca/images/PDFs/01_Peach.pdf>.  
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law at all, as it involves cases where no Charter claim per se is engaged, 
and influences only the Administrative Law analysis where exercises of 
administrative discretion are challenged. On the other hand, it introduces 
Constitutional principles into a far broader array of settings (well beyond 
the notions of Government action in the section 32 or Dolphin Delivery 
sense of the term). The introduction of Charter values as a distinct 
methodology applicable outside Charter claims in the context of judicial 
review over administrative discretion arrived with Doré v. Barreau du 
Québec.28 Loyola offered the first opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
revisit, explore and apply the Doré framework. For this reason, it is 
especially telling that the majority and concurring decisions agree on the 
result but are ships passing in the night in terms of whether Charter 
values or a Charter claim per se apply.29 
Loyola involved a decision by Quebec’s Minister of Education, 
Recreation and Sport denying Loyola High School an exemption from a 
provincially-mandated curriculum which included a required course on 
world culture and religion. Loyola is a private Catholic secondary school 
for boys, established by Jesuits in the 1840s. The required course in 
Ethics and Religious Culture (“ERC”) was initiated for the 2008-2009 
school year, and compels teachers to be objective and impartial in their 
instruction – so that, for example, instructors at a Catholic school would 
have to teach Catholicism as a world religion amongst others in a neutral 
way. The provincial scheme making this course a requirement allowed 
private schools to seek an exemption if they provided an equivalent 
alternative. Loyola applied for an exemption based on the view that this 
curriculum was incompatible with its Catholic mission and convictions. 
It proposed an alternative program that discussed major world religions 
and ethical positions but with Catholic values at its core. 
The Minister denied Loyola’s request for the exemption. She 
determined that its alternative program was faith-based, and thus at odds 
with the ERC Program’s secular goals. Loyola brought an application for 
judicial review. 
                                                                                                                       
28 [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.), affg [2010] J.Q. no 88 (Que. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Doré”]. 
29 See for discussion Kirk Andrews, “The Majority: Water in Loyola’s Wine” (March 23, 2015), 
The Court, online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2015/03/loyola-v-quebec-part-i-the-majority-water-in-loyolas-
wine/>; and “Loyola v Quebec, Part II: Freedom of Religion for Religious Organizations” (April 2, 2015), 
The Court, online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2015/04/loyola-v-quebec-part-ii-freedom-of-religion-for-
religious-organizations/>.  
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The majority saw this exercise of ministerial discretion as clearly 
within the sphere of Charter values, as explained by Justice Abella: 
This Court’s decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 
395, sets out the applicable framework for assessing whether the 
Minister has exercised her statutory discretion in accordance with the 
relevant Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protections. Doré 
succeeded a line of conflicting jurisprudence which veered between 
cases like Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
1038, and Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, that applied s. 1 (and a traditional Oakes analysis) 
to discretionary administrative decisions, and those, like Lake v. 
Canada (Minister of Justice), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761, which applied an 
administrative law approach. The result in Doré was to eschew a literal 
s. 1 approach in favour of a robust proportionality analysis consistent 
with administrative law principles.30 
One of the main areas of confusion arising out of the Doré 
framework involves the scope of Charter values – are these delineated 
by the language of Charter rights or do they extend to values such as 
privacy and human dignity which are implied by Charter rights but not 
included expressly in any Charter provisions.31 Justice Abella attempts 
to clarify this question in the following passage: “Charter values — 
those values that underpin each right and give it meaning — help 
determine the extent of any given infringement in the particular context 
and, correlatively, when limitations on the right are proportionate in 
light of the applicable statutory objectives… .”32 Suffice it to say this 
encapsulation raises as many issues as it resolves. While this is not 
necessarily unhelpful at an early stage of working through the precise 
delineation of Charter values, at some point a crisper account of 
Charter values will be needed. 
Under the Doré framework, those who exercise discretion must 
consider the presence and implications of Charter values and balance these 
against the objectives of the statute or policy. Justice Abella stresses the 
contextual aspect of the Doré framework. She notes that it responds to  
the diverse settings within which discretionary decision-makers operate 
and highlights deference to the expertise of the decision-makers (even, 
                                                                                                                       
30 Id., at para. 3. 
31 See also L. Sossin and M. Friedman. “Charter Values and Administrative Justice” (2014) 
67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 391. 
32 Id., at para. 36. 
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controversially, when it comes to understanding Charter principles in 
particular policy contexts). 
A reviewing Court considers whether the decision-maker’s balancing 
of these factors was reasonable. In the context of Loyola, in other words, 
the question for the Court was whether the Minister balanced religious 
freedom for Loyola against the secular goals of the curriculum. The 
majority concluded that the curriculum allowed for significant variation 
in instruction, as long as the competencies were tied to the program’s 
goals: that is, the recognition of others and the pursuit of the common 
good. By requiring that all aspects of Loyola’s alternative program be 
taught from a neutral perspective, including its instruction on 
Catholicism, the state was telling it how to teach the religion that 
“animates” Loyola’s identity. The majority found that this undermined 
the ability of institutions offering religious education to convey faith 
based principles to the children whose parents chose to expose them to 
these principles. In short, the Minister’s decision limited freedom of 
religion more than necessary given the statutory objectives. 
While finding for Loyola, Justice Abella expressed reservations about 
its alternative program. Loyola sought to teach other ethical and religious 
frameworks from the “lens” of Catholic ethics and morality. It was 
determined that this would transform the ethics component from a study 
of different ethical approaches to a study of Catholicism. She elaborated: 
In any event, it is the Minister’s decision as a whole that must reflect a 
proportionate and therefore reasonable balancing of the Charter 
protections and statutory objectives in issue. It does not, in my 
respectful view, because it rests on the assumption that a confessional 
program cannot achieve the objectives of the ERC Program. This 
assumption led the Minister to a decision that does not, overall, strike a 
proportionate balance between the Charter protections and statutory 
objectives at stake in this case. It is, with respect, unreasonable as a 
result.33 
For this reason, the remedy selected by the majority was not to grant 
the exemption sought by Loyola but to remit the matter back to the 
Minister for reconsideration. 
The concurring reasons, jointly authored by Chief Justice McLachlin and 
Moldaver J., approach the challenge as a Charter claim around the violation  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
33 Id., at para. 79. 
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of freedom of religion. They do not take issue with the application of the 
Doré framework but rather ignore it altogether. Applying the well-accepted 
section 2(a) freedom of religion framework, the concurring minority finds a 
clear violation of the freedom of religion of those who choose to attend 
Loyola and the “collective development of belief” and conclude this 
violation cannot be justified under section 1, and further, that the only 
possible remedy would be to grant the exemption Loyola sought. This 
approach to such a new and important area of constitutional thought is 
genuinely puzzling. Where, in the past, members of the Court have 
disagreed with each other on whether to apply a constitutional or 
administrative law methodology to the review of discretionary decisions 
(e.g., Multani or Trinity Western), this has been the subject of the judgments 
themselves. For the concurring Justices to determine that the 
Doré framework was not necessary or applicable without even a passing 
reference as to why is telling. 
As Loyola demonstrates, much remains to be determined in the 
context of Charter values. Must a reviewing court apply Charter values 
and an administrative law analysis every time an exercise of 
administrative discretion is challenged that engages those values, or do 
applicants have the choice whether to challenge those decisions either (or 
both) on Administrative Law/Charter Values grounds as well as through a 
Charter claim itself? Loyola raises this issue starkly as the Trial Court 
reached a decision on a Charter claim by Loyola (prior to Doré), then the 
Quebec Court of Appeal reversed and applied a Charter values analysis 
(post Doré). The majority applies an Administrative Law/Charter values 
analysis and sees no reason for a Charter analysis while the concurring 
minority does the precise opposite.  
Given the similarity of outcome, there is a temptation to see the 
methodological divergence as academic. It is not. Charter values 
represent a potentially substantial expansion of the reach of the Charter – 
extending to all discretionary decision-makers subject to Administrative 
law review for reasonableness – a category including all agencies, 
boards, tribunals, self-regulating professions, universities, hospitals and 
pretty much the entire broader public sector. Further, because the Doré 
framework envisions deference to administrative decision-makers in 
ways a Charter claim would not, Charter values also holds the promise 
that our understanding the Charter and its relevance could be enhanced 
by the expertise of discretionary decision-makers across diverse policy 
contexts.  
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4. Righting Wrongs: Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 
Like Charter values, the emergence of Charter damages has generated 
promise and tension. On the one hand, for those whose rights have been 
infringed, the Charter’s section 24(1) jurisdiction to provide any remedy 
that is “just and appropriate in the circumstances” held out the promise 
that damages would play a key role in deterring unconstitutional conduct 
and promoting a culture of freedom and equality. On the other hand,  
the prospect of turning constitutional dialogues into debates about 
compensation raised clear tensions – for instance, should the wealthy 
individual whose valuable heirlooms are destroyed by an unreasonable 
search be entitled to greater compensation than the homeless individual 
whose shelter is destroyed by an unreasonable search. If private law 
principles of compensation are imported into the field of Charter 
damages, then quite literally, some people’s rights will be more valuable 
than others. These issues figured in one of the most significant Charter 
damages case decided by the Supreme Court – especially as the loss 
involved wasn’t an item with a replacement value but rather close to 
three decades of a person’s life. 
The Court’s 2010 decision in Ward (dealing with a far less grave type of 
harm)34 set out a framework for evaluating the competing considerations 
inherent in a determination of the appropriateness of Charter damages. 
The Ward test for an award of damages under section 24(1) of the Charter 
consists of four steps: (1) establishing a Charter breach; (2) establishing that 
damages would serve at least one of the functions of compensation, 
vindication or deterrence; (3) If (1) and (2) are established, the onus shifts to 
the state to show that there are “countervailing considerations” (such as 
alternative remedies or “good governance concerns”) that would make 
Charter damages inappropriate or unjust; and (4) establishing the appropriate 
quantum of damages. 
The question of Charter damages and application of this framework in 
the context of wrongful conviction, arose in Henry v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General).35 Ivan Henry spent almost 27 years in prison and 
was declared a “dangerous offender” for a series of violent sexual 
                                                                                                                       
34 Vancouver (City) v. Ward, [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 2010 SCC 27 (S.C.C.), varg [2009] 
B.C.J. No. 91 (B.C.C.A.). 
35 [2015] S.C.J. No 24, 2015 SCC 24 (S.C.C.), revg [2014] B.C.J. No. 71 (B.C.C.A.). See 
for analysis Katya Bogdanov, “Henry v British Columbia: Defending Rights, or the State?” (July 
2015), The Court, online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2015/07/henry-v-british-columbia-defending-
rights-or-the-state/>. 
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assaults in the early 1980s. In 2010, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal quashed Mr. Henry’s convictions and entered aqcuittals on all 
charges, due to serious errors in the conduct of the trial (among other 
flagrant violations, the Crown had failed to provide Mr. Henry with 30 
inconsistent victim statements and medical evidence).36 Mr. Henry, once 
released, sued the City of Vancouver, the Attorney General of British 
Columbia and the Attorney General of Canada, seeking damages for his 
wrongful convictions and imprisonment. The Supreme Court judgment 
concerns only the award of damages against the Attorney General for 
British Columbia under section 24(1) of the Charter for failures to meet 
disclosure obligations under the Charter. 
In Henry, the Court considered a potentially vast new terrain of 
Charter damages – prosecutorial conduct that, without malice, was found 
to infringe the Charter rights of an individual. The majority, in a 
judgment authored by Justice Moldaver, held that a Charter claimant 
must provide intent in order to justify Charter damages for prosecutorial 
conduct – in other words, Mr. Henry would have to show that the 
prosecutors intentionally withheld information which they knew, or 
ought to have known, to be of material help to the defence.  
The majority asserts its approach is responsive to cases like Mr. Henry’s, 
since intention “may be inferred”.37 Justice Moldaver summarizes the 
standard as follows: 
As discussed, a cause of action for Charter damages will lie where the 
Crown, in breach of its constitutional obligations, causes harm to the 
accused by intentionally withholding information when it knows, or 
would reasonably be expected to know, that the information is material 
to the defence and that the failure to disclose will likely impinge on the 
accused’s ability to make full answer and defence.38 
That said, the majority appears to accept the submissions of the Attorneys 
General that fear of civil liability should not be allowed to “distract” or 
unduly influence prosecutorial decision-making as might be the case if 
the bar for Charter damages were set too low. This argument is as 
unsavory as it is unpersuasive. It is unsavory as it suggests prosecutors 
are a vulnerable group who need protection in the development of 
Charter damages rather than focusing on the remedy needed by those 
subject to state action whose Charter rights have been breached. And it is 
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37 Id., at para. 86. 
38 Id., at para. 82. 
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2015 19 
unpersuasive because the notion of a “chill” or distraction due to concerns 
over liability arises from a private law perspective, where officials may 
become more cautious where their own, personal liability may be engaged. 
Private law perspectives simply are unsuited to the task of identifying and 
enforcing public and constitutional duties. Rather than worry about whether 
police officers, prosecutors, national security officials or others who wield 
the enormous array of state law enforcement resources (and legitimacy to 
deprive people of their liberty) will be distracted by legal and constitutional 
accountability for their actions, Government could focus more usefully on 
recruiting, training and supporting prosecutors and law enforcement officers 
well versed in their legal and constitutional obligations. The majority speaks 
of Charter damages as a private law dynamic, as if there were no distinction 
between civil claims for malicious prosecution and Charter claims. Consider, 
for example, the following passage from Justice Moldaver’s reasons:  
It may seem harsh to deny Charter damages for cases of wrongful non-
disclosure which, while less serious, still result in a violation of an 
accused’s Charter rights. However, it is a reality that wrongful non-
disclosures will cover a spectrum of blameworthiness, ranging from the 
good faith error, quickly rectified, to the rare cases of egregious failures 
to disclose exculpatory evidence. Given the policy concerns associated 
with exposing prosecutors to civil liability, it is necessary that the 
liability threshold be set near the high end of the blameworthiness 
spectrum. In reaching this conclusion, I do not purport to create silos 
of Charter violations, classifying some as worthy of concern and others 
as inconsequential. Courts should endeavour, as much as possible, to 
rectify Charter breaches with appropriate and just remedies. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to awarding Charter damages, courts must 
be careful not to extend their availability too far.39 
The key issue of broader implication here, in my view, is whether a 
private law standard (malice) would be imported into the Charter damages 
analysis, or whether Charter damages should remain fundamentally a 
matter of public law and accord to public law principles. For private law, 
blameworthiness is a key aspect of the legal standard. The relevance that 
blameworthiness could have in remedying a Charter breach, however, is 
far less clear. For public law principles, the issue is not liability on the part 
of individual prosecutors for particular conduct but rather the unjustified 
harm imposed on those subject to state authority flowing from breaches of 
their rights under the Charter. 
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For the concurring Justices – Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice 
Karakatsanis – demonstrating intention represents too high a bar, and they 
would require only proof that a Charter remedy was “appropriate and just” 
to advance the purposes of compensation, vindication or deterrence. They 
further (and, in my view, correctly) found arguments around prosecutorial 
“distraction” not applicable to settings where the issue was prosecutorial 
obligation to comply with fundamental Charter rights.40  
In light of Henry, and the requirement that a failure to disclose on the 
part of the state be intentional to trigger compensation, even with the 
possibility that this can be inferred from the circumstances, it is unlikely that 
Charter damages will play an expanded role in the accountability of state 
actors. As Katya Bogdanov observes, “I do not see an appreciable difference 
between this test and the tests requiring malice.” I share this assessment – 
once the focus is on the intent or blameworthiness of the prosecutor, the 
ability of Charter damages to meaningfully fulfil the potential of Charter 
remedies under section 24(1) is precluded. While there may be cases where 
the degree of intentionality could make a difference, these will be few and of 
questionable general application. In the end, notwithstanding the principled 
stand taken by the concurring minority, Henry calls into question the Court’s 
resolve under the Charter to ensure against rights without remedies. 
While this brief consideration of some of the cases from 2015 with 
wide-ranging and long-lasting implications highlights the continuing 
impact of the Supreme Court on the evolution of the Canadian 
Constitution, the Court itself is evolving in important ways as well.  
III. 2015: A CHANGING OF THE GUARD 
The year 2015 marked the end of the decade of the Harper 
Government – and as if to provide a bookend to that era, Justice Marshall 
Rothstein, the first of Harper’s seven SCC appointments, retired in 
August, 2015, just weeks before the Liberals under Prime Minister 
Trudeau swept to power with a majority Government and an activist 
platform to reform Supreme Court appointments.41 
Marshall Rothstein participated in 126 Constitutional decisions, and 
as the chart below illustrates, he rarely dissented in Constitutional cases. 
                                                                                                                       
40 Id., at paras. 128-29. 
41 The Liberal platform included a commitment to “restore dignity and respect to the 
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 MAJORITY DISSENT CONCURRING  
Year (Co)/Wrote Joined (Co)/Wrote Joined (Co)/Wrote Joined Total 
2006 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
2007 2 9 0 1 1 0 13 
2008 1 9 1 2 0 0 13 
2009 3 7 0 0 0 1 11 
2010 0 22 0 1 0 1 24 
2011 0 13 0 0 1 0 14 
2012 0 8 0 1 0 0 9 
2013 1 10 0 0 0 0 11 
2014 5 7 1 0 0 1 14 
2015 1 10 2 1 1 1 16 
TOTAL 14 96 4 6 3 4 127 
While Justice Rothstein may be better remembered for his leadership 
in Administrative and Regulatory Law (particularly in areas of federal 
jurisdiction, building on his many years in a Transportation Law practice, 
and as a Justice of the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal), his 
contributions to Canadian Constitutional Law certainly have been 
consequential. 
Justice Rothstein wrote or co-authored notable majority judgments in 
Charter cases – such as Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop,42 extending 
the reach of the rights of same sex spouses in the context of pension 
rights, but he will be best remembered more recently for his spirited 
opposition to extending the Charter’s reach, including in the context of 
labour relations as reflected in his dissents in Mounted Police,43 and 
Saskatchewan Federation,44 discussed above. 
Justice Rothstein also took up the cause of judicial restraint in his 
expansive concurring judgment in Fraser,45 a judgment which set the 
stage for the section 2(d) trilogy discussed above. In Fraser, a majority 
                                                                                                                       
42 [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, 2007 SCC 10 (S.C.C.), affg [2004] O.J. No. 4815 (Ont. C.A.). 
43 Dissenting alone, at paras. 159-270. 
44 Dissenting with Justice Wagner, at paras. 204-76. 
45 Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, 2011 SCC 20 (S.C.C.), revg 
[2008] O.J. No. 4543 (Ont. C.A.). See also the analysis of Justice Rothstein’s concurring reasons in 
Paul Cavalluzzo, “The Fog of Judicial Deference” (2012) 16 C.L.E.L.J. 369. 
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of the Court found the Agricultural Employees’ Protection Act, 2002 
(“AEPA”), which provided minimal labour rights to agricultural workers, 
to be constitutional (with Abella J. alone dissenting). The majority 
applied the earlier decision of the Court in Health Services, establishing a 
right to collective bargaining under section 2(d) of the Charter, but 
emphasized its flexibility and the fact that it did not prescribe any 
particular model of collective bargaining over others. 
Justice Rothstein (with Justice Charron concurring) also upheld the 
legislation, but went further in his concurring judgment in Fraser to set 
out a far more radical position, one that would have reversed the Court’s 
judgment in Health Services. His reasoning, in short, was that the policy 
balance inherent in labour relations was fundamentally political and 
unsuited to the role of the Court. He summarized his position in the 
following terms: 
In my view, s. 2(d) protects the liberty of individuals to associate and 
engage in associational activities. Therefore, s. 2(d) protects the 
freedom of workers to form self-directed employee associations in an 
attempt to improve wages and working conditions. What s. 2(d) does 
not do, however, is impose duties on others, such as the duty to bargain 
in good faith on employers.46 
Generally, Justice Rothstein’s voice emerged as a clarion call for 
judicial deference to Parliament. A salient example of this approach 
occurred in Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General),47 a 2014 case in which the majority of the 
Court held unconstitutional the imposition of court fees. Justice 
Rothstein vigorously dissented, particularly taking issue with the 
majority’s reliance on implied or unwritten constitutional principle to 
support striking down legislated fees – he argued forcefully that such 
judicially crafted principles, not clearly flowing from the text of a 
constitutional provision, should not be used as a basis to strike down a 
legislative provision. He wrote: 
In engaging, on professed constitutional grounds, the question of the 
affordability of government services to Canadians, the majority enters 
territory that is quintessentially that of the legislature. The majority 
looks at the question solely from the point of view of the party to 
litigation required to undertake to pay the hearing fee. It does not 
consider, and has no basis or evidence upon which to consider, the 
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questions of the financing of court services or the impact of reduced 
revenues from reducing, abolishing, or expanding the exemption from 
paying hearing fees. Courts must respect the role and policy choices of 
democratically elected legislators. In the absence of a violation of a 
clear constitutional provision, the judiciary should defer to the policy 
choices of the government and legislature. How will the government 
deal with reduced revenues from hearing fees? Should it reduce the 
provision of court services? Should it reduce the provision of other 
government services? Should it raise taxes? Should it incur debt? These 
are all questions that are relevant but that the Court is not equipped to 
answer. I respectfully dissent.48 
The 2015 year in the life of the Supreme Court will not be 
remembered only for who departed, but also for who arrived. During 
2015, two new Justices joined the Supreme Court: Suzanne Côté (who 
was appointed in December of 2014 and sworn in on January 9, 2015) 
and Russell Brown (who was appointed in August of 2015 and sworn in 
on October 6, 2015). 
The Supreme Court at the end of 2015 includes only two Justices not 
appointed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Government – Justices 
Abella (Martin) and McLachlin (Mulroney). It remains too early to 
assess the impact of the most recent appointments – Justice Côté’s first 
Constitutional decisions included 2 dissents and 2 concurring decisions, 
but at the time of writing she has yet to pen a majority decision on a 
Constitutional issue. Justice Brown did not participate in a 2015 
Constitutional decision so remains to be heard from. In a sense, then, the 
real impact of the “Harper Court” may not be seen until after Prime 
Minister Harper’s departure. While the unexpected resignation of Justice 
Cromwell in 2016 will provide an early indication of the activist 
progressive Justices many believe Prime Minister Trudeau will appoint, 
he may not have many opportunities in this mandate to leave his 
Government’s mark on the Court. The next scheduled vacancy would 
occur with Chief Justice McLachlin’s mandatory retirement in 2018. 
Nevertheless, given the Trudeau Government’s commitment to diversity 
and inclusion, it is worth asking whether this will be the last annual 
update where the author needs to highlight that Canada’s Supreme Court 
has never had a member with an Indigenous background, or who was 
                                                                                                                       
48 Id., at para. 82. For discussion of Justice Rothstein’s theory of judicial deference to 
Parliament, see L. Sossin, “The Humility of Administrative Law” (2016) 74 S.C.L.R. (2d) 189-209, 
and more generally I. Entchev and L. Kelly (eds), Judicious Restraint: The Life and Law of Justice 
Marshall E. Rothstein (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2016).  
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brought up in a faith other than Christianity and Judaism, or who is part 
of a racialized community?  
For now, the Court remains in transition, as a shift occurs from the 
influence of the Harper Government’s early appointments (Rothstein, 
Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis) to his later ones (Wagner, 
Gascon, Côté and Brown). As 2015 demonstrated, however, against this 
backdrop, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella remain the 
dominant forces on the Court, together authoring 11 Constitutional 
majority judgments, and writing or co-authoring almost all of those 
highlighted above as most significant.  
In summary, the year 2015 in the life of the Canadian Constitution 
and the Supreme Court was revealing of consensus in some familiar 
areas but more notably surfaced fundamental divergences in the reach of 
the Charter and the premise of Canadian Federalism, and demonstrated 
just how much the Canadian constitutional project remains a work in 
progress. 
